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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the law as reflected in the rest of the Civil Code than a literal
interpretation of the article would be. Since an instance would
be rare in which debts or liabilities of a succession would remain
in force for thirty years, it is doubtful whether the court will
ever be called upon to give meaning to the "or renounce" phrase
of the article. Except for this one inconsistency, which for practi-
cal reasons will probably never be presented to the court, the
Tarver theory offers a simple and workable solution to this
troublesome problem of interpretation.
Charles C. Gray
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
PART I
The congestion of the Supreme Court docket seems to have
led the court to insist vigorously upon the complete fulfill-
ment of all the requirements for establishing its appellate
jurisdiction. The practice under the new Rule IX1 of reshuffling
the voluminous matters awaiting adjudication has not stopped
the influx of appealable cases, and effective relief can be found
only in further limiting the court's appellate jurisdiction.2
Constitutional restriction of the court's appellate jurisdiction
has consistently been accomplished by increasing the minimum
jurisdictional amount.3 If no constitutional convention is forth-
coming within the next year, a constitutional amendment to re-
lieve the bottleneck on appeals would seem to be warranted.
4
1. Rule IX of the Supreme Court, §§ 2-4, Revised October 4, 1951, effective
January 1, 1952, permits assignment of cases to the preference docket in case
of a rehearing, a special assignment, advancement to the preference docket,
or certification of questions by the courts of appeal. "Section 3. Any case
on the regular docket may be transferred to the preference docket, . . . by
order of the Court founded on a written motion of the attorney . . . repre-
senting any party to the suit requesting the transfer. ... Special assign-
ments are made under Section 4 where the state or its subdivisions are
parties, and in matters impressed with "public interest" or, finally, in cases
in which the court, "upon the showing made, believes that the ends of
justice require an immediate hearing .. .
2. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
3. The Constitutions of 1812, 1845, 1852, and 1864 required $300; the
Constitution of 1868 effected a change to $500, which was retained in the
Constitution of 1879. The latter was amended pursuant to La. Acts 1882, No.
125, p. 174 to fix the minimum at $2,000, which was retained in the 1898,
1913 and 1921 Constitutions.
4. H.B. No. 202 of the 1954 legislature proposed a constitutional amend-
ment to LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10, which would have restricted the civil
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The Louisiana State Law Institute, in its Projet for a new con-
stitution, recommends a substantial change in the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court by proposing that the jurisdictional
amount for civil suits be set at eight thousand dollars. 5 The want
of adequate statistics makes it impossible to ascertain the pro-
portion of cases which an upward revision of the jurisdictional
amount would affect, but the $8,000 figure seems well calculated
to accelerate the disposition of appeals.
The failure to provide constitutional relief has forced the
court to rely upon available statutes and its own inherent powers
to solve the problem. As a device for interpreting the effects
upon the jurisdictional amount of remittiturs, stipulations, affi-
davits, cumulation of demands, and palpable inflation, the court
has apparently relied upon Article 92 of the Code of Practice:
"The consent of parties cannot render a judge competent to try
a cause which . . . can not be brought before him. ... 6 La.
R.S. 13:4441, permitting transfers of appeals between the appel-
late courts,7 has been used increasingly in recent years, perhaps
because it focuses attention on the jurisdictional issue. But the
most direct recognition of the problem was the Supreme Court's
observation, while applying its new Rule X, Section 2,8 that:
"This Court became cognizant of the fact that we had enter-
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court materially. It would have in-
creased the minimum jurisdictional amount to $10,000, and eliminated juris-
diction of questions concerning the constitutionality or legality of a tax,
local improvement assessment, toll or impost, fine, forfeiture or penalty. It
was returned to the House without action by the judiciary committee to
which it had been referred, and was subsequently withdrawn.
5. PROJET OF A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA Art. VI, §
16 (Louisiana State Law Institute, 1950).
6. LA. CODE OF PRACTIcE of 1870.
7. Formerly La. Acts 1904, No. 56, p. 135, as amended, La. Acts 1912, No.
19, p. 25, now LA. R.S. 1950, §§ 13:4441-13:4442. LA. R.S. 1950, § 13:4441, pro-
vides that "In any case otherwise properly brought up on appeal to the
Supreme Court, or to any of the courts of appeal, the judges of these courts
may, in cases where the appellant or appellants shall have appealed to the
wrong court, transfer the case to the proper court instead of dismissing the
appeal .. " The act requires that when the court of appeal has erron-
eously transferred a case to the Supreme Court, the "latter court shall not
dismiss the appeal, but shall retransfer such case to the court of appeal .... "
For statements to the effect that the entire provision is mandatory, see State
v. Cook, 197 La. 1027, 3 So.2d 114 (1941) and Succession of Goree, 68 So.2d
636 (La. App. 1953).
8. Rule X, § 2, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, effective January
1, 1952, requires the brief of the appellant to set forth "a statement of the
appellate jurisdiction of [the Supreme Court] as applied to the case .... "
Cf. Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-Civil
Procedure, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 306, 313 (1953) and Bench and Bar, 26
TULANE L. REV. 491, 494 (1952).
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tained jurisdiction in a number of cases in the past because
the question of our jurisdiction had not been raised, but
under our new rules the appellant is required to set forth
in his brief the appellate jurisdiction of this Court as applied
to the case. ... "9
More subtle evidence of the court's insistence upon the
establishment in the record of its appellate jurisdiction has been
its reluctance to permit the use of affidavits and stipulations as
devices to establish jurisdiction.1" Since 1898, the Constitution
has expressly provided that the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction for the determination of questions of fact
affecting its own appellate jurisdiction.1 In the exercise of
this power the court has remanded cases to lower courts for
the purpose of introducing pertinent evidence into the record
and has also accepted affidavits or stipulations of the parties as
evidence of jurisdiction. Recently, however, the court has vir-
tually ceased accepting affidavits and has instead remanded the
cases to the lower court 12 or transferred them to the courts of
appeal under the provisions of La. R.S. 13:4441.13
The discussion which follows seeks to suggest the general
approach taken by the Supreme Court to the determination of
its appellate jurisdiction, principally in those areas where there
has been some recent variation from the approach taken in the
past. The discussion attempts to highlight the relatively recent
modifications in the three basic divisions of the Supreme Court's
9. State ex rel. Sitges v. Bayou Terre Aux Boeuf Drainage Dist., 221 La.
985, 989, 60 So.2d 895, 897 (1952). Cf. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Civil Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 198,
206 (1953).
10. See p. 886 infra.
11. LA. CONST. Art. 85 (1898); LA. CONST. Art. 85 (1913).
12. "In such cases the Supreme Court ordinarily remands to the court
of first instance for the purposes of having the necessary evidence submitted.
Cf. Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Co., 177 La. 373, 148 So. 440, 1933."
1 MCMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 94, n. 15 (1939).
13. Beene v. Pardue, 67 So.2d 337 (La. App. 1953). See also Peters v.
Fonville, 67 So.2d 331 (La. App. 1953); Ilardo v. Agurs, 67 So.2d 559 (La. App.
1953).
This practice has been criticized as involving unnecessary delay and
circuitous routing of the litigation to the trial court for taking evidence.
For an analysis of the problems created by such transfers, see The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1958 Term-Civil Procedure,
14 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 198, 210 (1953).
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appellate jurisdiction: jurisdictional amount,14 constitutional
questions,15 and the miscellaneous areas of jurisdiction. 16
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
Money Judgments
The Supreme Court "shall have appellate jurisdiction in
civil suits where the amount in dispute, . . . irrespective of the
amount therein claimed, shall exceed two thousand dollars. .. ."1
Subject to the rules on palpable inflation, 8 judicial admission, 9
and remittitur prior to judgment,20 the general test of appellate
jurisdiction over monied demands is the amount in dispute when
the case was submitted to the trial court for decision, not the
14. "[Civil suits where the amount in dispute, or the fund to be dis-
tributed, irrespective of the amount therein claimed, shall exceed two
thousand dollars, exclusive of interest. . . ." LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
15. "It shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases wherein the consti-
tutionality or legality of any tax, local improvement assessment, toll or
impost levied by the State, or by any parish, municipality, board, or sub-
division of the State is contested, or where the legality, or constitutionality
of any fine, forfeiture, or penalty imposed by a parish, municipal corporation,
board, or subdivision of the State shall be in contest . . . or a law of this
State has been declared unconstitutional .... LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
16. The Supreme Court "shall have appellate jurisdiction of all suits for
divorce or separation from bed and board, and of all matters arising therein;
of suits involving alimony, of suits for the nullity of marriage, for interdic-
tion, or involving the tutorship of minors, or curatorship of interdicts, or
the legitimacy, or custody of children, and of matters of adoption and
emancipation.
"... Its appellate jurisdiction shall also extend to all cases involving
homestead exemptions irrespective of the amount involved, and the appeal
on the law and the facts shall be directly from the court in which the case
originated to the Supreme Court; except that in cases involving only movable
property, the appeal shall lie to the court having jurisdiction of the amount
or the value of the property involved.
"The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall also extend to
criminal cases on questions of law alone, whenever the penalty of death, or
imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed; or where a fine exceeding
three hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six months has been
actually imposed." LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
17. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
18. Mitchell v. Shreveport Laundries, 221 La. 686, 60 So.2d 86 (1952);
Nash v. Curette, 216 La. 190, 43 So.2d 262 (1949), 218 La. 789, 51 So.2d 71
(1951); Trahan v. Breaux, 212 La. 459, 32 So.2d 845 (1947); Walsh v. Bush,
206 La. 303, 19 So.2d 144 (1944).
19. Defendant's judicial admission: D'Asaro v. Cotonio, 223 La. 624, 66
So.2d 572 (1953); Jackson v. Perkins, 221 La. 526, 59 So.2d 708 (1952); Ledet
v. Rodgers, 220 La. 650, 57 So.2d 217 (1952); Reed v. Eureka Homestead
Society, 174 La. 823, 141 So. 847 (1932); Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co. v.
Lynch, 157 La. 21, 101 So. 797 (1924) and authorities cited therein.
20. Remittitur before judgment: Walker v. Fitzgerald, 214 La. 293, 37
So.2d 712 (1948) (plaintiff's tacit consent); Dutton v. Harmonia Insurance
Co. of Buffalo, N.Y., 191 La. 72, 184 So. 546 (1938). Cf. The Work of the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939 Term-Procedure, 2 LoUISIANA LAW
Rsvizw 135, 145 (1939); Wolf v. Thomas, 137 La. 833, 69 So. 269 (1915).
880 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. XIV
amount of the judgment.21 After judgment by the trial court,
neither party can deprive the other of his right of appeal by
remission of the debt;22 conversely, both are prohibited from
gaining jurisdiction by consent.23
The Constitution expressly excludes interest from the calcu-
lation of the jurisdictional amount, 24 but penalties, attorney fees
and costs, when provided for by contract or statute, are added to
the main amount to determine appellate jurisdiction. 25 The Con-
stitution also provides that incidental demands such as reconven-
tion, intervention, and judgments for costs must follow the main
,demand on appeal. "If there be no right of appeal on the main
demand, the appeal shall lie to the court having jurisdiction of
the reconventional demand. ' '26
Parties having a common interest in recovery may cumulate
their actions in a single suit, but the amounts of their demands
may not be aggregated to gain jurisdiction.27 In Vogt v. Janna-
relli28 this rule was applied to a suit by a husband and wife, as
co-plaintiffs, for damages "arising out of the same circumstances."
The suit was declared to embody two separate causes of action,
and the amounts of the claims were held not subject to aggrega-
tion, for the reason that the wife's claim was her separate prop-
21. Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co., 217 La. 401, 46 So.2d 312 (1950); Walker
v. Fitzgerald, 214 La. 293, 37 So.2d 712 (1948). But see, for amount of judg-
ment of trial court, T. A. Pittman, Inc. v. Crescent City Plumbing and
Heating Co., 149 So. 784 (La. App. 1933), and Teche Lines v. Gorum, 7 So.2d
736 (La. App. 1942), transferred 202 La. 993, 13 So.2d 291 (1943).
22. State v. Cook, 197 La. 1027, 3 So.2d 114 (1941), and authorities cited
therein; Griffin v. Bank of Abbeville and Trust Co., 69 So.2d 153 (La. App.
1953).
23. Holland v. Gross, 195 So. 837 (La. App. 1940).
24. ". . . two thousand dollars exclusive of Interest. LA. CONST. Art.
VII, § 10.
25. Thompson v. Jones, 200 La. 437, 8 So.2d 286 (1942); Buras v. Fidelity
and Depos. Co. of Md., 195 La. 244, 196 So. 335 (1940); Willis v. Johnson,
43 So.2d 299 (La. App. 1949); Smith v. Atkins, 23 So.2d 649 (La. App. 1945),
transferred 211 La. 369, 30 So.2d 121 (1947). Statutory penalties and reason-
able attorney fees: Hammack v. Resolute Fire Ins. Co., 223 La. 655, 66 So.2d
583 (1943); Madison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 190 La. 103, 181 So.
871 (1938).
26. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 1.
Intervention: Louisiana State Board of Med. Examiners v. McHenery,
222 La. 984, 64 So.2d 242 (1953); Hebert v. T. L. James & Co., 221 La. 1044,
61 So.2d 734 (1952).
Incidental demand-taxing of costs: Jiles v. Venus Community Benevo-
lent Aid Ass'n, 195 So. 363 (La. App. 1940).
27. Southern Timber & Land Co. v. Wartell, 109 La. 453, 33 So. 559 (1903).
For an analysis of the jurisprudence on this point, see 1 MCMAHON, Louisi-
ANA PRACTICE 86, n. 8.1 (Supp. 1952).
28. 195 La. 277, 196 So. 346 (1940).
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erty and the husband's, that of the community. The test of
amount in dispute was applied to each claim separately.
The Constitution does not allow the Supreme Court to enter-
tain appeals from "suits for damages for physical injuries to, or
for the death of a person, or for other damages sustained ...
arising out of the same circumstances. '29  This provision has
been interpreted as vesting appellate jurisdiction over the whole
of such appeals in one court, that is, the appropriate court of
appeal.8 0 In practice, therefore, if no demand for damages for
physical injuries is involved, claims for damages of all other
types are appealable to the Supreme Court when the amount in
dispute exceeds $2,000.31 But the presence in the pleadings of a
prayer for damages for physical injuries confers exclusive appel-
late jurisdiction upon the courts of appeal, irrespective of the
amount claimed.82 The most serious problem in this area is the
interpretation of the phrase "arising out of the same circum-
stances," which was rendered even more difficult by the decision
in Cavalier v. Original Club Forest,83 in 1951. That case involved
a course of events closely connected in time, which gave rise to
claims for damages for personal injuries and for defamation,
and the court held both causes of action to have arisen out of the
"same circumstances." However, the court overruled two similar
cases3 4 where there was an appreciable interval of time between
the acts complained of, holding the causes not to have arisen from
the "same circumstances." Since the overruled cases were ap-
parently distinguishable from the Cavalier case because of the
time interval between events, there is some doubt as to what rule
the court will apply to similar cases in the future.
29. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
30. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 29; Jumonville v. Frey's, Inc., 171 So. 590
(La. App. 1937).
31. Spearman v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 164 La. 677, 114 So.
591 (1927).
32. Beauvais v. D. C. Hall Transport, Inc., 217 La. 388, 46 So.2d 307 (1950);
Kirkwood v. McFarland, 217 La. 386, 46 So.2d 307 (1950); Sibley v. Petty
Realty Co., 215 La. 597, 41 So.2d 230 (1949). But see O'Rourke v. O'Rourke,
69 So.2d 567 (La. App. 1953), cert. granted, where the court of appeal retained
jurisdiction despite the absence of a prayer for damages for physical injuries,
relying upon allusions in the petition to "suffering physically," "physically
upset," and "setback in her recovery."
33. 220 La. 183, 56 So.2d 147 (1951), 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 500 (1952).
See also Searcy v. Interurban Trans. Co., 179 So. 93 (La. App. 1937); Miller
v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 13 So.2d 733 (La. App. 1943).
34. Newsom v. Starns, 174 La. 955, 142 So. 138 (1932); Applewhite v. New
Orleans Great Northern Ry., 148 So. 261 (La. App. 1933).
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Fund To Be Distributed
The "fund" cases usually involve money demands payable
only out of a fund, or claims to a portion of certain definite prop-
erty of any sort which has been appraised and inventoried. Suc-
cession, receivership, liquidation, and concursus proceedings and
disputes arising out of third oppositions are appealed on the
basis of amount of the fund to be distributed. The amount de-
posited in the registry of the court or the appraised value of the
property inventoried 35 is generally taken as the jurisdictional
amount. In Succession of Banker, where the legal representative
of the succession had partially disposed of the succession fund
under a final judgment homologating his accounts, appellate
jurisdiction was determined in terms of the balance of the fund
remaining to be distributed.3 6 However, when the claim is in
the nature of a partition, as among heirs claiming a specific por-
tion,3 7 or in cases where the status of property as separate or
community is sought to be determined,38 the interest asserted
by the claimant is considered the amount in dispute and controls
appellate jurisdiction. But where the plaintiff's demand, if
granted, would require a re-distribution of the original "fund to
be distributed," the amount of the fund controls.3 9 Appeals from
judgments on incidental demands in cases involving a fund to be
distributed follow the jurisdiction of the main issue.40
Declaratory Judgments
The relatively new device of obtaining declaratory judg-
ments 41 is frequently used to settle in advance the kinds of prob-
35. Succession of Lecompte, 196 La. 287, 199 So. 122 (1940); Succession of
Wengert, 178 La. 1027, 152 So. 747 (1934).
The amount must appear affirmatively in the record: Succession of
Derouen, 216 La. 957, 45 So.2d 91 (1950) (where inference of amount
was drawn from the amount of the appeal bond); Succession of Lynch, 124
La. 127, 49 So. 1002 (1909) (where mere allegation of value was uncertain
and problematical).
36. 197 La. 229, 1 So.2d 87 (1941). See also Knighton v. Safety Tire Serv-
ice, 177 La. 762, 149 So. 448 (1933); Ferguson v. Gulf Lumber Co., 135 La.
974, 66 So. 317 (1914) (defendant bonded the sequestered property); In re
Weinberger Banana Co., 20 So.2d 30 (La. App. 1944).
37. Succession of Jackson, 68 So.2d 127 (La. App. 1953).
38. Succession of Wesley, 222 La. 411, 62 So.2d 625 (1952).
39. Succession of Goree, 68 So.2d 636 (La. App. 1953).
40. Vives v. Vives, 67 So.2d 329 (La. App. 1953).
41. LA. R.S. § 13:4231 (1950), which provides: "Courts of record . . . may
declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief
is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection
on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The
declaration may be either affirmative or negative In form and effect. .... "
[VOL. XIV
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lems formerly raised in the concursus or "fund" cases discussed
above. Although the Supreme Court has entertained appeals in
a few declaratory judgment cases, it has not announced a definite
rule for the determination of its own appellate jurisdiction in
this area.4 2 An early decision in Board of Comm'rs of Port of
New Orleans v. Hibernia National Bank was widely interpreted
as an indication that the court would receive no appeals under
the act. The Court in that case said:
"It seems apparent that a suit, having as its sole object the
judicial declaration of rights which do not presently, and
may never, require enforcement is neither a monied demand
nor one in which the matter in contest can be said to be
capable of monetary appraisement. '48
Moreover, in First National Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans,44
which involved the interpretation of a $275,000 contract, the
Court declared, "as a matter of fact there is no issue in con-
test. . . " These statements recall the old Louisiana cases an-
nouncing that, under the Constitution, there was no basis for an
appeal to the Supreme Court where there was no monied de-
mand.45 Even after accepting jurisdiction of several appeals
from declaratory judgments, the court in 1953 said of a suit to
have a contract to purchase realty declared valid, "[T]he amount
which the defendant has offered to pay is not, and indeed, nothing
else seems to be in dispute. '46
Illustrative of the court's attitude towards appeals from de-
claratory judgments is Succession of Solari, wherein the vendee
of a universal legatee sought to have the bequest of a $45,000
estate declared valid in an effort to clear title to his $350 pur-
chase. The Court said, "The plaintiff is only claiming property
of the value of $350 and the necessity of passing on the will is
only incidental to the plaintiff's demand and a collateral issue
42. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952
Term-Civil Procedure, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 306, 316 (1953); The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term-Civil Procedure,
12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 184, 191 (1952).
43. 219 La. 208, 211, 52 So.2d 753 (1951). See The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term-Civil Procedure, 12 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 184, 193 (1952).
44. 218 La. 9, 16, 48 So.2d 145, 147 (1950).
45. Hite v. Hinsel [Himel], 39 La. Ann. 113, 1 So. 415 (1887); Buddig v.
Baldwin, 38 La. Ann. 394 (1886); Saux v. Patton, 34 La. Ann. 1155 (1882);
State v. Miscar, 34 La. Ann. 834 (1882).
46. Bierhorst v. Kelly, 223 La. 737, 742, 66 So.2d 791, 792 (1953), transferred
68 So.2d 111 (La. App. 1953) (rehearing denied).
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which cannot be considered in fixing the jurisdiction of the
appeal. '47
In appeals from declaratory judgments, affidavits of the
parties have been refused on the grounds that they were con-
jectural as to the value of the rights sought to be adjudicated.
Furthermore, where a monied demand for $75 was cumulated
with a request for the construction of a contract involving a
$3,000 bond, the court transferred the matter to the court of
appeal on the theory that Article VII, Section 10, of the Consti-
tution did not apply to the case.48
Although there are several declaratory judgment cases in
which the court has applied the usual tests for establishing the
jurisdictional amount, the reported opinions yield no clear rule
of thumb. In one case, plaintiff sought to be recognized as the
owner of a one-eighth interest in certain property. The court
alluded to testimony in the record that the property was worth
"eight to ten thousand dollars," but transferred the appeal.49
On the other hand, the court took appellate jurisdiction over
several mineral royalty cases,50 without explaining why. In one
of these, the court stated that there was'"no factual issue . . .
involved in the case."'' In another, the opinion reveals that a
complete record of the sales of the interests involved was pre-
sented on appeal. This may have supplied the requisite proof
of the jurisdictional amount.52 The court in Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Thompson, the latest mineral royalty case accepted
on appeal under the Declaratory Judgment Act, states in a foot-
note that the record clearly demonstrated the requisite jurisdic-
tional amount.58 The most recent reported case in which the
court took jurisdiction, Succession of Rolling, contains no men-
tion of the value of the estate or the jurisdictional issue. The
47. 218 La. 671, 676, 50 So.2d 801, 802 (1951). See The Work of the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term-Civil Procedure, 12 LouISANA
LAW REVIEW 184, 192 (1952).
48. Nelson v. Associated Branch of Pilots of Port of Lake Charles, 221
La. 1015, 61 So.2d 463 (1952). See also for refusal of affidavits, Fireside
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 220 La. 794, 57 So.2d 687 (1952).
49. Krokroskia v. Martin, 220 La. 992, 58 So.2d 205 (1952).
50. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Nat. Pro. Co., 221 La. 608,
60 So.2d 9 (1952); Southwest Nat. Pro. Co. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.,
221 La. 617, 60 So.2d 12 (1952); Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 221 La. 626, 60 So.2d
65 (1952); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Thompson, 222 La. 868, 64 So.2d
202 (1953).
51. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Nat. Pro. Co., 221 La. 608,
60 So.2d 9 (1952).
52. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 221 La. 626, 60 So.2d 65 (1952).
53. 222 La. 868, 871, n. 1, 64 So.2d 202, 203, n. 1 (1953): "The cash value of
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case involved the interpretation of two olographic wills. 54 The
courts of appeal in declaratory judgment cases have looked to
the proof adduced on trial, and in two recent decisions have
ordered the appeals transferred to the Supreme Court. 55
Mary Ellen Caldwell
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
PART II
Amount in Dispute Measured by Value of the Thing in Dispute
The Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction is
often sought in cases where the subject matter of the suit is not
money, but something which can be evaluated in terms of money,
such as the possession of immovables, contract rights, and the
title to real property. Usually the grounds urged to establish the
court's jurisdiction are that the amount in dispute is in excess
of $2,000. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held in these cases
that "In determining whether this court has appellate jurisdic-
tion because of the amount in dispute, or because of the value
of the thing in dispute . . . the record must show affirmatively
that the court has appellate jurisdiction. . .. "'
The court has never precisely defined what constitutes an
affirmative showing of jurisdiction in the record. In Heirs of
P. L. Jacobs v. Johnson,2 the court examined the record for evi-
dence of the value of the land in a jactitory action and based
its opinion on the consideration recited in prior transfers of the
land and on the value of mineral deeds and leases affecting the
land, which were incorporated into the record. The court re-
the mineral rights in dispute is far In excess of the sum of $2,000 and there-
fore this court is vested with appellate jurisdiction of the case."
54. 68 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1953).
55. Parker v. Tillman, 69 So.2d 534 (La. App. 1953); St. Cyr v. Boland,
34 So.2d 69 (La. App. 1948).
1. State v. Cook, 197 La. 1027, 1036, 3 So.2d 114, 116 (1941). See also The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Civ4W Proce-
dure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 198, 207 (1953), and cases cited therein at 207,
n. 31.
2. 219 La. 125, 52 So.2d 444 (1951).
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